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Abstract 
Computer security professionals have used passive network countermeasures for several years 
in order to secure computer networks. Passive countermeasures such as firewalls and intrusion 
detection systems are effective but their use alone is not enough to protect a network. Active 
countermeasures offer new ways of protecting a computer network. Corporations and 
government entities should adopt active network countermeasures as a means of protecting 
their computer networks. 
Introduction 
Providing security to computers on networks 
is a relatively new art, though the techniques 
used to do so have roots in defensive 
measures used by the military for centuries. 
The military has relied on many different types 
of countermeasures to aid in conflict, most of 
which can be categorized as passive or 
active. 
Passive countermeasures have been the 
traditional devices used in providing network 
security. The development of security 
techniques has slowed, maybe even stalled, 
in recent years. While vendors are adding 
new (and sometimes useful) features to 
firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs), the rate of computer break-ins 
continues to increase. The problem with the 
current network security paradigm is that 
passive countermeasures have not stopped 
or slowed security compromises. 
Information security professionals, system 
administrators, and managers of these people 
need to look at active countermeasures in 
order to respond to network attacks. As 
defined by [I], a countermeasure is "an action 
or device designed to negate or offset 
another." In my research an active network 
countermeasure is defined as a 
countermeasure that sends network traffic to 
the perceived source fhat produced the 
offending behavior. 
Passive Countermeasures 
The above definition is in contrast to passive 
network countermeasures such as firewalls, 
software patches, and intrusion detection that 
do not directly respond to the perceived 
source of an attack. Described below are a 
few passive countermeasures and why they 
are useful but lacking necessary 
characteristics for defending a computer 
network. 
The first and maybe most popular of these 
passive countermeasures is the firewall. 
Firewalls fulfill the role for which they were 
designed, but holes still exist even when a 
firewall is configured properly in a network. 
This is illustrated by firewall rules that are 
written so certain incoming ports are open to 
the world either for convenience sake or to 
allow for ease of use for the users behind the 
firewall. An example of this is active mode 
FTP where port 20 is typically opened to allow 
an inbound data connection in concert with an 
outbound control connection. This allows for 
port scans and vulnerability exploitation of 
machines behind the firewall provided that 
these actions are initiated from source port 
20. More recently, firewalls have been 
promoted as the only tool necessary for 
securing a computer or network. This is most 
easily seen by the current practice of 
marketing personal firewalls as the ultimate 
security solution. 
Applying software patches is another of the 
common passive countermeasures. This has 
become a full-time job at some large 
organizations. Most IT professionals realize 
that software patches are only a temporary 
countermeasure to poorly coded software 
though. Software patches will not suffice as 
adequate countermeasures even with remote 
software distribution systems such at 
netoctopus. Using software patches as a 
countermeasure will fail at many small 
organizations because these organizations 
often lack the size to hire dedicated IT staff. 
Large organizations will not be protected by 
the software patch countermeasure because 
some computers will inevitably fall through the 
cracks. In addition, the turnaround time from 
disclosure of a vulnerability to distribution of a 
patch on a corporate network can often be too 
long. Full disclosure of software vulnerabilities 
is now closely followed by distribution of 
proof-of-concept code that exploits those 
vulnerabilities which is then followed itself by 
distribution of malicious code that 
incorporates the proof-of-concept code. 
Intrusion detection systems are used as 
another type of passive countermeasure. 
They have created a buzz in the academic 
and corporate worlds as the latest and 
greatest network security systems. IDSs are 
well tuned to alert system administrators and 
security personnel to possible break-ins. 
Some IDSs even trigger automatic blocking of 
source IP addresses using Access Control 
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Lists (ACLs). IDSs do miss intrusions and 
remote scans though. Slow network scans 
are hard to detect using IDSs. Sometimes 
network attacks come days or even months 
after the initial reconnaissance done by the 
attacker. Most IDSs on the market do not 
issue intrusion alerts in real time. If they do, 
security administrators are usually so 
overwhelmed with alerts that they cannot 
respond in real time. 
Active network countermeasures 
Active network countermeasures provide 
many new lines of defense in network 
security. They can be used to "fill" empty 
address space. Despite the available IPv4 
address space being reported as rapidly 
dwindling. many organizations own large 
blocks of address space that are actually 
populated very sparsely. This makes target 
hosts easy to find for a would-be attacker 
using widely available network 
reconnaissance tools such as nmap. A simple 
network response program can be written so 
that the network appears to be fully populated 
to those tools. Our experience has shown that 
a simple measure such as this is enough to 
convince a would-be attacker to move his/her 
scanning and attacking on to a different 
network. 
The second feature active countermeasures 
provide is to hold an attacker in a honeypot, 
whether a physical or virtual honeypot. Tools 
such as honeyd by Niels Provos (found at [Z]) 
can be used to till the empty address space 
with virtual computers or even virtual 
networks. Attackers use fingerprinting tools to 
determine the operating system being run on 
possible target machines. The results of these 
fingerprint scans give an attacker a good idea 
as to which machines hekhe wants to attack 
based on potential vulnerabilities. Virtual 
honeypot hosts can be made to look like 
computers running any imaginable operating 
system with a wide array of user 
programmable services running on those 
hosts. The honeyd tool is customizable to the 
point that an attacker would have a hard time 
determining whether a physical computer 
exists at a given IP address rather than a 
virtual host. 
Using a honeypot as a countermeasure fulfills 
a different goal than the usual use of physical 
honeypots. The purpose is not to study the 
behavior of attackers as is typically done, but 
rather the purpose is to trap, distract, and 
confuse attackers. Physical and virtual 
honeypots alike can offer enough feedback to 
an attacker to cause himlher to spend a lot of 
time in the honeypot. This sort of 
countermeasure succeeds by 
containing/trapping the attacker in an area 
where helshe is not interfering with business- 
critical computing. Honeypots serve to keep 
attackers away from business-critical 
machines by appearing more attractive to 
attackers than the surrounding authentic 
hosts on authentic networks. Honeypots 
achieve this goal by carefully choosing 
banner strings to return in response to 
network service probes. For instance, when 
an attacker scans a network for vulnerable 
versions of an FTP sewer as reported by the 
server's banner string, a honeypot machine 
(physical or virtual) can send back a 
vulnerable server string in order to attract the 
attacker. 
The third countermeasure feature provided by 
honeypots is the ability to confuse and 
frustrate attackers. A network set up as 
described in the first active countermeasure 
example above will cause a Class B or ClDR 
116 network to appear to have over 65,000 
active hosts when probed by an attacker. Just 
as a network with completely filled address 
space will confound an attacker and cause 
himlher to move on to a different network, a 
network with confusing or unbeiievable 
characteristics will do the same. Virtual hosts 
can be configured to respond to network OS 
fingerprint scans as any conceivable OS with 
a TCPllP network stack. Configuring a 
network to appear to have 5,000 high- 
powered Cisco routers or 3,000 FreeBSD 2.0 
machines could convince an attacker to move 
on to more susceptible networks. Beyond 
simple emulation of a host on a network, the 
network itself can be virtualized. Causing a 
given network of any size to suffer from a 
terrible packet loss problem only when 
communicating with even numbered IP 
addresses could likewise cause an attacker to 
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rethink hislher selection method for choosing 
victim networks. 
Active network countermeasures not only 
provide immediate security by trapping or 
confusing an attacker, but active 
countermeasures can also indirectly aid in 
network security research. This is similar to 
the purpose of physical honeypots where 
compromised systems reveal valuable 
information describing the current threat. With 
strategically coded virtual honeynets virus 
and worm data can be collected without 
infecting physical machines. Responding in 
certain ways to viruses or worms will trigger 
the attacking code to send information and 
sometimes itself to the supposed target. A 
system administrator can then analyze the 
executable or even source code of the 
viruslworm. The system administrator can 
then make changes to existing passive and 
active countermeasures to defend against the 
virus andlor worm. 
In addition to capturing worm and virus data 
for analysis, active countermeasures can be 
used to contain a worm and keep it from 
spreading. Responding to a worm in a certain 
prescribed manner can cause the worm to 
become trapped while trying to infect a 
network, keeping it from moving on to new 
targets. 
Additional issues in using active 
countermeasures 
When using active network countermeasures, 
care should be taken so as not to impair 
legitimatelsanctioned use of the network. 
RFC791 states a general rule of thumb to 
apply when implementing the Internet 
Protocol: "An implementation must be 
conservative in its sending behavior, and 
liberal in its receiving behavior." This principle 
should apply when actively responding to 
network traffic so that legitimate traffic is not 
mistook for hostile traffic. The degree to which 
this applies, of course, depends on the nature 
of the network being protected and, therefore, 
is a matter of policy within the protected 
organization. 
A person employing active countermeasures 
on their network must also be aware of the 
legal issues involved with doing such. Active 
countermeasures could be implemented in 
such a way that a system administrator 
breaks the law when trying to defend hidher 
network from someone who is breaking the 
law. 
Summary 
Traditional security methods including passive 
countermeasures are not complete solutions 
when securing networks and hosts on those 
networks. Though their use has provided 
many a system administrator with timely 
protection, they lack the dynamic interaction 
that appears to be critical when defending a 
network. Blocking network datagrams via a 
firewall provides security at the cost of 
usability, Plugging security holes is an 
essential system administration task, but 
patch distribution is an evolving art. While 
detecting attacks and sending alerts with 
IDSs has come a long way, current rule- 
based systems miss some of attacks. 
Active countermeasures offer a new way of 
protecting a network. They provide security by 
participating in the typical commerce seen on 
a network. Active countermeasures fill 
address space, trap and frustrate attackers, 
and contribute to stopping viruses and worms. 
These countermeasures do not simply report 
or block attacks, but they attempt to deceive 
the attacker by presenting a network in the 
best way possible to deter such actions. 
Academia and industry need to look beyond 
the current network security paradigm to the 
innovative solutions that active 
countermeasures can offer. Continued 
support for research in developing new active 
countermeasures and refining existing ones 
should be pursued by government agencies 
and industry. Small-scale deployment and 
testing of active countermeasures is needed 
at both the corporate and government levels 
now, while larger scale implementations 
should be planned soon. Advances in 
computer network attacks demand smarter 
defense mechanisms to combat smarter 
attackers. We must raise the bar if we are to 
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protect our assets and keep the attacker at 
bay. 
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